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The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many 
scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief 
test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent experiments show that children 
implicitly attribute beliefs even earlier. The dispute does not only concern the empirical 
issue of discovering children’s early cognitive abilities. It also depends on the kind of 
capacities that we associate to the very concept. I claim that concept possession must be 
understood in terms of the gradual development of the abilities that underlie the concept 
in question. I also claim that the last step to possess the concept of belief requires children 
to understand how beliefs and desires are used in everyday explanations of people’s 
actions. Thus, I suggest that understanding folk psychology as an explanatory theory is 
what children lack when they fail the false belief test.
WHAT DOES THE FALSE BELIEF TEST 
TEST?
198
The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of 
debate. Until recently, psychologists have relied for evidence on a standard 
procedure, the false belief test (FBT). In the classical version of FBT, the location 
change task (Wimmer & Perner 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith 1985), a 
child is presented with a scene in which a puppet puts an object in a box and 
leaves the room to play. While the puppet is away, another character moves 
the object from the box to another place. When the puppet returns, the child 
is asked: “Where will the puppet look for the [object]?”. If the child points to 
the box, this demonstrates the ability to consider the puppet’s belief about 
the object’s old position as opposed to relying on his or her own knowledge of 
its real position. 
Extended research showed that children younger than four perform very 
poorly on several versions of the test1. Not only do they often fail but their 
scores are rarely above chance (Wellman, Cross & Watson 2001; Wellman 
& Liu 2004; Milligan, Astington & Dack 2007). We know that this result does 
not depend on the complexity of the test’s linguistic presentation2. Thus, 
empirical research highlights younger children’s inability to consider others’ 
point of view. Many have hence argued that children lack the concept of 
belief before they are able to pass FBT.
Nevertheless, recent data collected through violation of expectancy, 
gaze-monitoring and other methods challenge this conclusion. Surian, 
Caldi & Sperber (2007), for instance, found that 13-month infants formed 
different expectations about a puppet’s future behaviour depending 
on whether the puppet had previously seen a desired object being put 
beyond a screen. Therefore, those infants apparently understand the 
puppet’s knowledge or ignorance about the object’s location. Other 
studies (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Southgate, Senju & Csibra 2007) show 
that children’s looking time anticipates the right answer in FBT already 
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1 Besides the location change task, different version of FBT are the unexpected content 
task (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner 1986; Perner, Leekam & Wimmer 1987; Gopnik & 
Astington 1988), the hide and retrieve task (Fodor 1992; Bloom & German 2000), and the 
unexpected-identity task (Gopnik & Astington 1988).
2 Children’s performance does not improve if they are asked about where the puppet will 
look for the object, or where it will say, or think, or know that the object is (Wellman et 
al. 2001). Several studies also show that methods to elicit non-linguistic answers from 
children do not improve the test’s outcome (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers 2002; de Villiers & de 
Villiers 2000; Wellman, Hollander & Schult 1996).
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around the second year of life3. Thus, it is argued, children have an implicit 
understanding of belief attribution much earlier than age four. Finally, 
the same phenomenon has been found using experimental tasks requiring 
more active choices (Buttelmann, Carpenter & Tomasello 2009). A growing 
body of empirical evidence hence strongly suggests that children younger 
than four are already sensitive to others’ beliefs although this ability is 
not manifested in all the contexts in which one would expect it. It appears 
that, before being able to pass FBT, children have at least an implicit 
understanding of others’ beliefs.
In this article, I resolve this apparent inconsistency in the empirical data by 
contending that the question about the age when children acquire the concept 
of belief concerns a theoretical, not only an empirical, question: which minimal 
capacities are necessary to possess a concept? I will claim that children do 
not generally acquire concepts at once, but that they gradually master them 
as they acquire various abilities connected to the concepts themselves. Thus, 
the empirical results that indicate the implicit understanding of others’ beliefs 
may demonstrate only a preliminary, partial possession of the concept of 
belief, a concept that must be present in a more mature form in order to pass 
explicit false belief tests. I will argue that the final step in the acquisition of 
this concept requires children to understand how beliefs and desires are used 
in everyday explanations of people’s actions. Thus, I will suggest, it is the lack 
of competence in folk psychological explanation that prevents children from 
passing FBT. I will provide empirical evidence supporting this view.
The debate hinges on whether children’s implicit belief attribution ability 
is a case of genuine belief attribution. This is at the same time both an 
empirical and a theoretical matter. Although the studies just reviewed show 
that children younger than four already have an implicit understanding of 
others’ beliefs, they do not clarify whether infants already possess the concept 
of belief. Some claim that this is indeed the case. These theorists argue that 
children’s failure on FBT reflects only a performance limitation, which makes 
it difficult to manifest their competence in reasoning about beliefs in more 
complex situations (Fodor 1992; Bloom & German 2000). As I will argue below, 
these theorists are committed to a minimalist conception of belief attribution. 
Others claim that children only possess the concept of belief when they pass 
FBT. According to them, children’s sensitivity to others’ beliefs does not 
demonstrate the possession of the concept of belief, because the relevant 
competence is so restricted. We are entitled to credit children with the 
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3 Clements & Perner (1994) already found that, but the exposition of their methodology was 
unclear and biased further research (see de Villiers & de Villiers 2003).
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concept of belief only when they show the general ability to make explicit 
predictions about others’ behaviour. Call this a maximalist conception of belief 
attribution.
Note that, despite the empirical opposition between the minimalist and the 
maximalist conception of belief attribution, they share a common theoretical 
presupposition, viz., that a concept is defined by a set of properties. 
Accordingly, concept possession is thought about in terms of all-or-nothing 
conditions: someone possesses a concept if and only if she is endowed with a 
particular set of abilities. The debate then concerns whether we are entitled 
to attribute the concept in question to beings manifesting just a subset of 
these abilities.
However, the view that concept identity is subject to necessary and sufficient 
conditions has been widely opposed in both the philosophical (Wittgenstein 
1953; Putnam 1975) and the psychological (Rosch 1975) literature. Since the 
work of Wittgenstein and Quine, philosophers are inclined to think that there 
are no analytical truths that define a concept4. It follows that we neither 
must expect there is a predefined set of abilities the manifestation of which 
ensures that one has any particular concept. Instead, the abilities manifesting 
the possession of a concept are progressively expanded in their domain of 
possible applications. We may say that each of these improvements reflects a 
better possession of a concept, but that none of these steps alone marks the 
acquisition of the ability. Concept possession is a matter of degree.
This conclusion helps to solve the debate about the age when children 
acquire the concept of belief. The question as it was posed at the beginning of 
this article is seen to be ill-formed: there is no precise age at which children 
acquire any concept; a fortiori, there is no age when children acquire the 
concept of belief. However, the question acquires a new meaning once that 
concept possession is seen along the lines of ability development. Indeed, if 
concept possession is a matter of degree, it becomes important clarifying (i) 
which are the relevant abilities for manifesting the possession of the concept 
of belief, and (ii) how and when they are learned, so that the concept itself is 
gradually mastered.
Providing a full list of relevant abilities is beyond the scope of this article. 
Roughly, the list should include, among the others, infants’ early abilities 
to intentionally interpret others’ behaviour (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra & 
Bíró 1995), infants’ early abilities to participate in joint attention exchanges 
(Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll 2005), as well as the early capacities 
usually associated with implicit false belief attribution. Herein, I want just 
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4 For a discussion of the problems connected with the traditional theory of concepts 
see, for example, Fodor (1998, cc. 3-4), and Laurence & Margolis (1999).
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to claim that the last ability manifesting the acquisition of the concept of 
belief will be that of mastering belief attribution not only to predict people’s 
behaviour, but also to explain it. This is a linguistic capacity, and it requires 
children to master what is usually called common sense, or folk psychology, 
that is, the theory, which is implicit in common talk about mental concepts, 
relating reasoning about different mental states.
Now, several abilities are required to master folk psychology as an 
explanatory practice. On the one hand, children need to understand the 
syntactic structure of mental verbs, i.e., the fact that mental verbs take 
sentences (i.e., that-clauses) as their complement5. On the other hand, 
children need to evolve their understanding of the complex network of 
relations between different mental verbs. Such a task is complicated by the 
fact that children do not encounter folk psychology all at once, but that they 
must reconstruct it from their participation in folk psychological narratives 
(Bruner 1990; Hutto 2008). Limited narrative ability means that children 
cannot learn to distinguish the functional meaning of different kinds of 
mental verbs (e.g., thinking as opposed to desiring verbs) in their third year 
(Rakoczy & Tomasello 2009). If passing FBT were connected to possessing the 
ability not just to predict, but also to explain others’ beliefs, then it would 
stand to a reason that children cannot pass FBT before they were able to 
perceive subtle differences between mental state verbs with respect to their 
role in the explanation of behaviour. In the next section, I will claim that this 
is indeed the case.
In the previous section, I have claimed that possessing the concept of belief 
is a gradual achievement. The final ability in the relevant suite of abilities 
constitutive of the possession of this concept, I have claimed, is the ability to 
use belief attribution in folk psychological explanation. I want now to argue 
that it is specifically children’s lack of a proper explanation of the puppet’s 
behaviour that prevents them from passing FBT before age four. Indeed, in 
FBT children are explicitly required by verbal interrogation to deliberate 
about the puppet’s behaviour. In many versions of the test, children are 
asked to justify their prediction, unmotivated results being scored as random 
answers. But even when no explicit justification is required, deliberating 
requires one to be able to support her conclusions. Therefore, children try to 
produce a prediction they can justify in conversational exchange.
Here is the impasse, for until age four, children do not master folk psychology 
as an explanatory theory. Of course, they are able to provide explanations 
WHAT DOES THE FALSE BELIEF TEST TEST?
5 This ability has been demonstrated to be related to children’s performance on FBT (de 
Villiers & Pyers 2002; de Villiers 2005).
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based on the status of the world. Such explanations may be sufficient to 
explain successful behaviours. However, in FBT, children need to know how 
beliefs justify behaviour even when behaviour is unsuccessful. Until they 
lack a general theory about rational agents’ behaviour, they are not able to 
do that. Thus, in the absence of contrasting reasons, what better justification 
than reality6 ? The only justification they may accept for the puppet’s 
behaviour brings them to a wrong prediction. On the other hand, once they 
master folk psychology as an explanatory theory, alternative explanations are 
available; consequently, children even attempt alternative predictions.
My proposal is consistent with those accounts according to which children’s 
failure in FBT must be imputed to their lack of linguistic competence (Astington 
& Baird 2005; Miller 2006; Milligan et al. 2007). However, it advances the deeper 
explanatory hypothesis that it is a lack of explanatory power, rather than some 
more direct linguistic inability, that explains children’s failures on the test. If 
this is correct, we should find that children’s performance in psychological 
explanations is predictive of their ability to pass the test. In particular, it should 
not be the case that children can provide reliable psychological explanation 
without being able to pass it. This is an empirical claim that can be easily tested.
An analysis of empirical research in explanatory versions of FBT leads to some 
prima facie conflicting, but nonetheless in the end consistent results. First, let us 
examine what is apparently contrary evidence. Bartsch & Wellman (1989) found 
that children’ explanatory competence is antecedent to the time when children 
can pass FBT. Nonetheless, their methodology is questionable with many 
respects. First, they prompted mental explanations by appropriate questioning 
when subjects’ initial answers did not provide them. Only 39 out of the 79 
collected explanations based on false belief attribution were not prompted. 
However, it is dubious that prompting had no effect on the ratio of mental 
explanations. Second, they were excessively well-disposed towards children 
in assessing good responses. Responses like “Because she wants to” including 
no reference to the object of the desire were scored as correct explanations in 
terms of belief-desire reasoning. Finally, children’s mental explanations were 
unbalanced towards desires (30% of the unprompted answers) as opposed to 
beliefs (18% of the unprompted answers)7.
Batsch and Wellman’s result is also odd when compared with much literature 
WHAT DOES THE FALSE BELIEF TEST TEST?
6 This effect has been somewhere called the “curse of knowledge” (Birch & Bloom 2007). 
Herein, I am not suggesting that children lack the ability to detach from reality in 
their predictions. Indeed, they have pretty good predictive capacities, as experiments 
on implicit belief attribution show. What they lack is an explanation for their own 
predictive capacities.
7 A similar analysis is also compatible with Bartsch, Campbell & Troseth (2007), 
although their method to prompt answers was more ecologically valid.
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finding exactly the opposite. For instance, Moses and Flawell (1990) presented 
three-year-old children with location change scenario. They report that 
only 3% of children’s explanations invoked the character’s false belief as the 
cause of her action; instead, children usually made reference either to the 
character’s desire, or to the outcome of the situation. Similarly, Wellman 
et al. (1996) analysed children’s performance in explanatory versions of 
FBT with the help of thought bubbles. They found that four- but not three-
year-olds were able to provide explanations to their answers. Also Wimmer 
and Mayringer (1998) contrasted children’s performance on predictive and 
explanatory false belief tasks and found that the latter was as just as difficult 
as the former. They concluded that children do not understand the causal 
link between misleading informational conditions, epistemic states, and 
resulting actions. Finally, Atance & O’Neill (2004) reported that only rarely 
three-and-half-year-olds referred to false beliefs in an explanatory version of 
an unexpected content task.
Therefore, it seems that children are unable to provide explanations of 
people’s actions until they pass FBT. This supports my claim that FBT does 
not tap children’s general ability to attribute beliefs, but only their more 
specific capacity to support belief attribution with reliable psychological 
explanations. Of course, the results provided are not by themselves sufficient 
to demonstrate such a claim. However, that no negative evidence has been 
provided already constitutes a positive hint to drive future investigation.
In this paper, I have argued that explaining children’s acquisition of 
the concept of belief requires clarifying our hidden assumptions about 
concept possession. Now, in the same way as we usually lack definitions to 
characterise concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, we also 
lack criteria to sharply define concept possession, which is better understood 
in terms of the gradual development of those abilities that possessing a 
particular concept provides.
If concept acquisition is interpreted as gradual, empirical evidence coming 
from studies on infants in their second year of life shows that they already 
possess a minimal concept of belief. However, I have pointed out that the 
final step to possess the concept of belief requires children to understand 
how beliefs and desires are used in everyday explanations of people’s actions. 
And I have suggested that it is the lack of this last capacity which prevents 
children from passing FBT before age four: when children are explicitly 
asked to predict the puppet’s future behaviour, they feel engaged in a 
conversational practice, and they respond according to the reasons they may 
provide to support their prediction. But understanding the right reasons 
for unsuccessful behaviour is a complex task, which is mastered only in 
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the fourth year. Acquiring it expands children’s predictive abilities beyond 
the limit of contextual interpretation of people’s actions. A review of the 
empirical literature about children’s ability to pass explanatory versions of 
FBT supported this interpretation8.
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8 I would like to thank Jay Garfield for his insightful comments on an earlier version of 
this manuscript. I would like to thank the members of the Language Acquisition Group 
of the Departments of Linguistics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, for the 
discussion about several topics related to this article.
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